I believe it is in Book V when Ivan and Alyosha discuss at the restaurant the existence of evil (specifically the suffering of children) and how Ivan cannot reconcile that with god. Ivan's solution is skepticism and he rejects god. Alyosha instead of rejecting god decides to try and help the evil in the world. In book X, Alyosha assists Ilyusha and his family as well as mending his relationship with Kolya. Instead of walling himself off from a world of evil, he attempts to combat it with faith and good acts.
I wonder if Dostoevsky is making a comment here about the perils of skepticism. Isolating yourself by elaborate proofs and theorems of skeptic thought can go too far; they may go far enough to fail to serve as a foundation for any further thought, whether that me ontological, epistemological, or as is much more common, axiological. Metaphysical solipsism, epistemological relativism, ethical subjectivism...these ideas while possible impossible to disprove leave us with nothing. It was not the skeptic, Ivan, that does good for these children, but the man of faith in something which he cannot prove.
Wednesday, May 2, 2012
Q&A Question 2: Abyss
Is it too paradoxical to claim an absence of meaning as a source of meaning?
Pihlstrom concludes by pointing out that perhaps our inability to answer the question of meaning might very well be an actual source of meaning. So, I suppose, technically, he is not claiming an absence of meaning is the source; he is contending that our perpetual struggle to find meaning might be a source thereof.
While this seems rather odd, almost contradictory (I myself uncritically dismissed it on my first read), there may be merit in such an idea. Striving to know an answer to a question, even a question that I can recognize will not have a satisfactory answer, can be a great source of motivation and drive. But I am wondering at the potential for a deeper paradox:
If the struggle to find meaning is the source of meaning, then we would succeed and finally find that meaning. If we found meaning then we would no longer need to struggle to find it and then, absent the struggle, we would lose that meaning as there is no longer the source.
Is this a trivial reading of the idea, or are there conceptual difficulties with this notion of struggling to find meaning as a source of meaning?
Pihlstrom concludes by pointing out that perhaps our inability to answer the question of meaning might very well be an actual source of meaning. So, I suppose, technically, he is not claiming an absence of meaning is the source; he is contending that our perpetual struggle to find meaning might be a source thereof.
While this seems rather odd, almost contradictory (I myself uncritically dismissed it on my first read), there may be merit in such an idea. Striving to know an answer to a question, even a question that I can recognize will not have a satisfactory answer, can be a great source of motivation and drive. But I am wondering at the potential for a deeper paradox:
If the struggle to find meaning is the source of meaning, then we would succeed and finally find that meaning. If we found meaning then we would no longer need to struggle to find it and then, absent the struggle, we would lose that meaning as there is no longer the source.
Is this a trivial reading of the idea, or are there conceptual difficulties with this notion of struggling to find meaning as a source of meaning?
Q&A Question 1: Guilt
Pihlstrom claims that feeling guilt, or at least the ability to do so, is fundamentally necessary to our ability to employ ethical concepts or judgments. His rationale for this is that without guilt we could not experience responsibility, the seat for ethical decisions.
My question then, naturally, is whether or not this is true. Is guilt necessary to employing ethical concepts?
My hypothesis is no. They are difficult to separate: there are very few people who operate without any sense or ability to feel guilt. So there is the empirical fact that the faculty of guilt so often accompanies the faculty to perform moral reasoning. This is insufficient though to prove a connection as strong as Pihlstrom is hinting at. Our moral reasoning is not a product of what makes us feel bad or good; at least it ought not be. Sure, immoral actions will often lead to a sense of guilt; this does not necessitate that guilt is necessary to moral reasoning. Our moral reasoning ought to be predicated by moral principles that can be rationally derived.
My question then, naturally, is whether or not this is true. Is guilt necessary to employing ethical concepts?
My hypothesis is no. They are difficult to separate: there are very few people who operate without any sense or ability to feel guilt. So there is the empirical fact that the faculty of guilt so often accompanies the faculty to perform moral reasoning. This is insufficient though to prove a connection as strong as Pihlstrom is hinting at. Our moral reasoning is not a product of what makes us feel bad or good; at least it ought not be. Sure, immoral actions will often lead to a sense of guilt; this does not necessitate that guilt is necessary to moral reasoning. Our moral reasoning ought to be predicated by moral principles that can be rationally derived.
Moral Contemplation
I mentioned this in class on Monday; I am fascinated by the lesson we might learn, or in the least, Dostoevsky might be attempting to portray, from Ivan's archetype. While Ivan is an extremely intelligent person and capable of advanced thought and reasoning, he nonetheless repeatedly accepts amoral to immoral conclusions. So are we to assume the point here is that detached contemplation is, maybe necessary, but insufficient for a moral life? I see two options here.
Obviously, since it was a yes or no question, there are two options.
Yes; that is the intended point. While contemplation and serious thought is required to resolve moral quandaries, there must exist also another factor that aids us in our decision making process. Pihlstrom seems to hint in the concluding remarks, as well we mentioned it in class, that guilt or the conscience might be one such answer. I am slightly uneasy with this though. We correctly identified the conscience as reinforcing the values we learn from our society and culture; if this were the base of our moral considerations, we would end up continuing to perpetuate the values of our culture. However, our culture repeatedly engages in immoral activity.
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No; while that is one lesson we could infer from this character trait of Ivan's, it is not the only one. Ivan could merely be wrong in his reasoning rather than his reasoning be insufficient. Ivan bases his argument on the premise that the only reason to lead a moral life is to secure a good afterlife. Thus, if one were not to believe in God, there would be no obligation to act morally. His father seems to actualize this theory. But divine punishment and reward is not the only reason to act morally; we may very well have a secular obligation to a moral life. Ivan could merely be wrong.
Question: What do you think? What could we infer from Ivan's primacy on reason?
Obviously, since it was a yes or no question, there are two options.
Yes; that is the intended point. While contemplation and serious thought is required to resolve moral quandaries, there must exist also another factor that aids us in our decision making process. Pihlstrom seems to hint in the concluding remarks, as well we mentioned it in class, that guilt or the conscience might be one such answer. I am slightly uneasy with this though. We correctly identified the conscience as reinforcing the values we learn from our society and culture; if this were the base of our moral considerations, we would end up continuing to perpetuate the values of our culture. However, our culture repeatedly engages in immoral activity.
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No; while that is one lesson we could infer from this character trait of Ivan's, it is not the only one. Ivan could merely be wrong in his reasoning rather than his reasoning be insufficient. Ivan bases his argument on the premise that the only reason to lead a moral life is to secure a good afterlife. Thus, if one were not to believe in God, there would be no obligation to act morally. His father seems to actualize this theory. But divine punishment and reward is not the only reason to act morally; we may very well have a secular obligation to a moral life. Ivan could merely be wrong.
Question: What do you think? What could we infer from Ivan's primacy on reason?
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