I voiced, today, the possibility, indeed proffered the hypothesis, that writers of literature and writers of philisophical discourse have distinct ends. The philosopher aims at truth while the novelist aims at the aesthetic. I used the term 'entertaining' today and I wish to recant that; it was an incorrect term. The novelist may be trying to convey an important concept, he might be trying even to get at the truth, but once she has chosen the form of literature as his medium, she commits himself to producing a work that is aesthetically pleasing. The aesthetic pleasure is an essential goal of the form.
Therefore, the use of metaphor and the laudability thereof is also distinct. It is my contention that the metaphor adds no meaning and is mostly an aestheticconsideration. Now, aesthetic considerations are extremely important but much more important for the novelist than the philosopher. I actually think that philosophers should pay some more attention to the aesthetic but not at the price of obscurity.
Wednesday, February 22, 2012
Q&A Question 2: Do Metaphors Exist?
If a metaphor meant merely what the literal words meant, then would metaphors exist?
This question attempts to take seriously the thesis of Davidson's paper. "This paper is concerned with what metaphors mean, and its thesis is that metaphors mean what the words, in their most literal interpretation, mean, and nothing more."
Davidsom acknowledges that this is controversial and is contrary to much, if not all, of previous opinion on the matter. As long as Davidson accepts that a phrase such as "Richard is a lion" is actually a metaphor, it is difficult to understand how he defends his position. All people who utter metaphors are merely mistaken? Metaphors become mere falsehoods. Literal prose and metaphors become one and the same; metaphors, as distinct linguistic entities cease to be.
This question attempts to take seriously the thesis of Davidson's paper. "This paper is concerned with what metaphors mean, and its thesis is that metaphors mean what the words, in their most literal interpretation, mean, and nothing more."
Davidsom acknowledges that this is controversial and is contrary to much, if not all, of previous opinion on the matter. As long as Davidson accepts that a phrase such as "Richard is a lion" is actually a metaphor, it is difficult to understand how he defends his position. All people who utter metaphors are merely mistaken? Metaphors become mere falsehoods. Literal prose and metaphors become one and the same; metaphors, as distinct linguistic entities cease to be.
Q&A Question 1: Metaphors in Philosophy
If metaphors are not only ornamental but can augment the impact of meaning, thought not semantically, would it then be acceptable to use metaphors in philosophical discourse?
My question from the q&a depends on my argument that while metaphors can be translated to purely literal language, that is that they do not introduce any unique semantic meaning, they still possess an twofold import that literal language lacks. The second half of the import is increased potency; metaphors, as with most indirect communication, has the potential to render the meaning of the metaphor more potent and longer lasting. A smartly crafted metaphor will have more impact.
Now, if this is true, which I do think so, there may be some venerable reasons to employ metaphors in philosophical discourse. I chose philosophical discourse as it is my discipline and the discipline of this seminar, but it may hold true for other academic writing as well.
So the question is: does the increased impact provide a benefit enough to override the inherent imprecision of a metaphor?
My question from the q&a depends on my argument that while metaphors can be translated to purely literal language, that is that they do not introduce any unique semantic meaning, they still possess an twofold import that literal language lacks. The second half of the import is increased potency; metaphors, as with most indirect communication, has the potential to render the meaning of the metaphor more potent and longer lasting. A smartly crafted metaphor will have more impact.
Now, if this is true, which I do think so, there may be some venerable reasons to employ metaphors in philosophical discourse. I chose philosophical discourse as it is my discipline and the discipline of this seminar, but it may hold true for other academic writing as well.
So the question is: does the increased impact provide a benefit enough to override the inherent imprecision of a metaphor?
The Pursuit of Ethics
Brett asked about the role of emotion in the philosophical pursuit of ethics. It is a fascinating question and one I wish to address.
Philosophy is often errantly conceived of as reason to the extent of existing as a wholly non-emotional discipline. This is, strictly, incorrect. Emotions are ever present and it would be foolish to deny it; the question then becomes an issue of how best to deal with the emotions. The problem, if it needs stating, is that emotions are, to some degree (less than is often thought), non-cognitive, or not regulated by reason. Therefore, in any attempt to arrive at the truth, non-reasonable entities are seen as a liability.
I want to distinguish between writing or thinking emotionally and writing or thinking about emotion. Philosophers would be neglegent to neglect the role emotions do play in making ethical decisions. As such emotions must be the subject of much philosophical discourse. On the other hand, emotions probably ought not be used in the formulation of ethical theory.
That having been said, I am not of the opinion that philosophical discourse must be dry, direct...etc... Emotional discourse can be included without too much trouble I think but only as augmentation, in addition to the reason, never in lieu thereof.
Philosophy is often errantly conceived of as reason to the extent of existing as a wholly non-emotional discipline. This is, strictly, incorrect. Emotions are ever present and it would be foolish to deny it; the question then becomes an issue of how best to deal with the emotions. The problem, if it needs stating, is that emotions are, to some degree (less than is often thought), non-cognitive, or not regulated by reason. Therefore, in any attempt to arrive at the truth, non-reasonable entities are seen as a liability.
I want to distinguish between writing or thinking emotionally and writing or thinking about emotion. Philosophers would be neglegent to neglect the role emotions do play in making ethical decisions. As such emotions must be the subject of much philosophical discourse. On the other hand, emotions probably ought not be used in the formulation of ethical theory.
That having been said, I am not of the opinion that philosophical discourse must be dry, direct...etc... Emotional discourse can be included without too much trouble I think but only as augmentation, in addition to the reason, never in lieu thereof.
Sunday, February 19, 2012
On the Acceptance of Masochism
Why do we enjoy reading tragedy in literature, who do we pursue melancholy and sadness in music?
This question is typically posed while denying that many people are inherently masochistic and as often as that is denied the affirmative solution of catharsis is proffered. We also read an account of this problem with responses and meta-responses. I think the use of meta-responses was very clever and likely to be true. I am merely contending that catharsis and masochism fit into that paradigm. Masochism is the practice of deriving pleasure from pain, in its most basic form. If the response is painful and sad, and then the meta-response, because the bad emotions were just catharticly removed, is positive, there is an accounting which synthesizes masochism, catharsis, and the meta-response.
This question is typically posed while denying that many people are inherently masochistic and as often as that is denied the affirmative solution of catharsis is proffered. We also read an account of this problem with responses and meta-responses. I think the use of meta-responses was very clever and likely to be true. I am merely contending that catharsis and masochism fit into that paradigm. Masochism is the practice of deriving pleasure from pain, in its most basic form. If the response is painful and sad, and then the meta-response, because the bad emotions were just catharticly removed, is positive, there is an accounting which synthesizes masochism, catharsis, and the meta-response.
Q&A Question 2: Characters
How important to our emotional reactions to fiction are the specifics of the characters?
This question affords me to opportunity to explicate my proffered solution to the paradox of fiction that I attempted, poorly, to articulate on Wednesday. As my question suggests, I think we are too focused on the characters of a story. Mistake me not, the characters are important to our emotional reaction, but what is irrelevant is the fact that they do not exist.
If the leg of a real sea captain, a captain whom we know, is removed by a large white whale, we would react with a certain emotion. This event has a certain form to it: Person (P)who we care about (PC)is harmed (H) in a particular way. (I understand this is a drastic oversimplification but it shall suffice for our purposes.) It is this concept that we are reacting to; (PC) is (H) and to this there is a corresponding emotional reaction. Nota Bene: if it was not someone we cared about, but rather merely (P) is (H) then the reaction, and the concept, would be different.
When we read Moby Dick, we encounter Ahab (P) and because Melville writes it so, we begin to care about him (PC) and then he is harmed in a particular way (H) and so the form is the same: (PC) is (H). We react to the form of the concept, not to the reality of the characters.
This question affords me to opportunity to explicate my proffered solution to the paradox of fiction that I attempted, poorly, to articulate on Wednesday. As my question suggests, I think we are too focused on the characters of a story. Mistake me not, the characters are important to our emotional reaction, but what is irrelevant is the fact that they do not exist.
If the leg of a real sea captain, a captain whom we know, is removed by a large white whale, we would react with a certain emotion. This event has a certain form to it: Person (P)who we care about (PC)is harmed (H) in a particular way. (I understand this is a drastic oversimplification but it shall suffice for our purposes.) It is this concept that we are reacting to; (PC) is (H) and to this there is a corresponding emotional reaction. Nota Bene: if it was not someone we cared about, but rather merely (P) is (H) then the reaction, and the concept, would be different.
When we read Moby Dick, we encounter Ahab (P) and because Melville writes it so, we begin to care about him (PC) and then he is harmed in a particular way (H) and so the form is the same: (PC) is (H). We react to the form of the concept, not to the reality of the characters.
Q&A Question 1: The Rationality of Emotions
To what extent can emotional reactions, responses that are largely non-cognitive, be rational or irrational?
This question is obviously begotten by Radford's acceptance of the fiction paradox thus rendering our emotional reactions to fiction irrational. I take as axiomatic that emotional reactions generally, but especially in response to fiction, are not actions of volition. If this is true, then the lack of will involved would seem to indicate that emotional processes are, at least partially, non-cognitive. For something to be irrational, or for that matter rational, it must be the product, or potentially the product, of reason and thought. If emotions are not processes of volition, then they are not the potential product of reason and thought and therefore cannot be irrational.
Are my premises true? Are emotional processes largely non-cognitive? Does it follow from this that they cannot be irrational?
This question is obviously begotten by Radford's acceptance of the fiction paradox thus rendering our emotional reactions to fiction irrational. I take as axiomatic that emotional reactions generally, but especially in response to fiction, are not actions of volition. If this is true, then the lack of will involved would seem to indicate that emotional processes are, at least partially, non-cognitive. For something to be irrational, or for that matter rational, it must be the product, or potentially the product, of reason and thought. If emotions are not processes of volition, then they are not the potential product of reason and thought and therefore cannot be irrational.
Are my premises true? Are emotional processes largely non-cognitive? Does it follow from this that they cannot be irrational?
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