The Pursuit of Ethics

Brett asked about the role of emotion in the philosophical pursuit of ethics. It is a fascinating question and one I wish to address.

Philosophy is often errantly conceived of as reason to the extent of existing as a wholly non-emotional discipline. This is, strictly, incorrect. Emotions are ever present and it would be foolish to deny it; the question then becomes an issue of how best to deal with the emotions. The problem, if it needs stating, is that emotions are, to some degree (less than is often thought), non-cognitive, or not regulated by reason. Therefore, in any attempt to arrive at the truth, non-reasonable entities are seen as a liability.

I want to distinguish between writing or thinking emotionally and writing or thinking about emotion. Philosophers would be neglegent to neglect the role emotions do play in making ethical decisions. As such emotions must be the subject of much philosophical discourse. On the other hand, emotions probably ought not be used in the formulation of ethical theory.

That having been said, I am not of the opinion that philosophical discourse must be dry, direct...etc... Emotional discourse can be included without too much trouble I think but only as augmentation, in addition to the reason, never in lieu thereof.