I believe it is in Book V when Ivan and Alyosha discuss at the restaurant the existence of evil (specifically the suffering of children) and how Ivan cannot reconcile that with god. Ivan's solution is skepticism and he rejects god. Alyosha instead of rejecting god decides to try and help the evil in the world. In book X, Alyosha assists Ilyusha and his family as well as mending his relationship with Kolya. Instead of walling himself off from a world of evil, he attempts to combat it with faith and good acts.
I wonder if Dostoevsky is making a comment here about the perils of skepticism. Isolating yourself by elaborate proofs and theorems of skeptic thought can go too far; they may go far enough to fail to serve as a foundation for any further thought, whether that me ontological, epistemological, or as is much more common, axiological. Metaphysical solipsism, epistemological relativism, ethical subjectivism...these ideas while possible impossible to disprove leave us with nothing. It was not the skeptic, Ivan, that does good for these children, but the man of faith in something which he cannot prove.
Wednesday, May 2, 2012
Q&A Question 2: Abyss
Is it too paradoxical to claim an absence of meaning as a source of meaning?
Pihlstrom concludes by pointing out that perhaps our inability to answer the question of meaning might very well be an actual source of meaning. So, I suppose, technically, he is not claiming an absence of meaning is the source; he is contending that our perpetual struggle to find meaning might be a source thereof.
While this seems rather odd, almost contradictory (I myself uncritically dismissed it on my first read), there may be merit in such an idea. Striving to know an answer to a question, even a question that I can recognize will not have a satisfactory answer, can be a great source of motivation and drive. But I am wondering at the potential for a deeper paradox:
If the struggle to find meaning is the source of meaning, then we would succeed and finally find that meaning. If we found meaning then we would no longer need to struggle to find it and then, absent the struggle, we would lose that meaning as there is no longer the source.
Is this a trivial reading of the idea, or are there conceptual difficulties with this notion of struggling to find meaning as a source of meaning?
Pihlstrom concludes by pointing out that perhaps our inability to answer the question of meaning might very well be an actual source of meaning. So, I suppose, technically, he is not claiming an absence of meaning is the source; he is contending that our perpetual struggle to find meaning might be a source thereof.
While this seems rather odd, almost contradictory (I myself uncritically dismissed it on my first read), there may be merit in such an idea. Striving to know an answer to a question, even a question that I can recognize will not have a satisfactory answer, can be a great source of motivation and drive. But I am wondering at the potential for a deeper paradox:
If the struggle to find meaning is the source of meaning, then we would succeed and finally find that meaning. If we found meaning then we would no longer need to struggle to find it and then, absent the struggle, we would lose that meaning as there is no longer the source.
Is this a trivial reading of the idea, or are there conceptual difficulties with this notion of struggling to find meaning as a source of meaning?
Q&A Question 1: Guilt
Pihlstrom claims that feeling guilt, or at least the ability to do so, is fundamentally necessary to our ability to employ ethical concepts or judgments. His rationale for this is that without guilt we could not experience responsibility, the seat for ethical decisions.
My question then, naturally, is whether or not this is true. Is guilt necessary to employing ethical concepts?
My hypothesis is no. They are difficult to separate: there are very few people who operate without any sense or ability to feel guilt. So there is the empirical fact that the faculty of guilt so often accompanies the faculty to perform moral reasoning. This is insufficient though to prove a connection as strong as Pihlstrom is hinting at. Our moral reasoning is not a product of what makes us feel bad or good; at least it ought not be. Sure, immoral actions will often lead to a sense of guilt; this does not necessitate that guilt is necessary to moral reasoning. Our moral reasoning ought to be predicated by moral principles that can be rationally derived.
My question then, naturally, is whether or not this is true. Is guilt necessary to employing ethical concepts?
My hypothesis is no. They are difficult to separate: there are very few people who operate without any sense or ability to feel guilt. So there is the empirical fact that the faculty of guilt so often accompanies the faculty to perform moral reasoning. This is insufficient though to prove a connection as strong as Pihlstrom is hinting at. Our moral reasoning is not a product of what makes us feel bad or good; at least it ought not be. Sure, immoral actions will often lead to a sense of guilt; this does not necessitate that guilt is necessary to moral reasoning. Our moral reasoning ought to be predicated by moral principles that can be rationally derived.
Moral Contemplation
I mentioned this in class on Monday; I am fascinated by the lesson we might learn, or in the least, Dostoevsky might be attempting to portray, from Ivan's archetype. While Ivan is an extremely intelligent person and capable of advanced thought and reasoning, he nonetheless repeatedly accepts amoral to immoral conclusions. So are we to assume the point here is that detached contemplation is, maybe necessary, but insufficient for a moral life? I see two options here.
Obviously, since it was a yes or no question, there are two options.
Yes; that is the intended point. While contemplation and serious thought is required to resolve moral quandaries, there must exist also another factor that aids us in our decision making process. Pihlstrom seems to hint in the concluding remarks, as well we mentioned it in class, that guilt or the conscience might be one such answer. I am slightly uneasy with this though. We correctly identified the conscience as reinforcing the values we learn from our society and culture; if this were the base of our moral considerations, we would end up continuing to perpetuate the values of our culture. However, our culture repeatedly engages in immoral activity.
--
No; while that is one lesson we could infer from this character trait of Ivan's, it is not the only one. Ivan could merely be wrong in his reasoning rather than his reasoning be insufficient. Ivan bases his argument on the premise that the only reason to lead a moral life is to secure a good afterlife. Thus, if one were not to believe in God, there would be no obligation to act morally. His father seems to actualize this theory. But divine punishment and reward is not the only reason to act morally; we may very well have a secular obligation to a moral life. Ivan could merely be wrong.
Question: What do you think? What could we infer from Ivan's primacy on reason?
Obviously, since it was a yes or no question, there are two options.
Yes; that is the intended point. While contemplation and serious thought is required to resolve moral quandaries, there must exist also another factor that aids us in our decision making process. Pihlstrom seems to hint in the concluding remarks, as well we mentioned it in class, that guilt or the conscience might be one such answer. I am slightly uneasy with this though. We correctly identified the conscience as reinforcing the values we learn from our society and culture; if this were the base of our moral considerations, we would end up continuing to perpetuate the values of our culture. However, our culture repeatedly engages in immoral activity.
--
No; while that is one lesson we could infer from this character trait of Ivan's, it is not the only one. Ivan could merely be wrong in his reasoning rather than his reasoning be insufficient. Ivan bases his argument on the premise that the only reason to lead a moral life is to secure a good afterlife. Thus, if one were not to believe in God, there would be no obligation to act morally. His father seems to actualize this theory. But divine punishment and reward is not the only reason to act morally; we may very well have a secular obligation to a moral life. Ivan could merely be wrong.
Question: What do you think? What could we infer from Ivan's primacy on reason?
Sunday, April 15, 2012
Dissemination
Nussbaum contends that literature is the best medium for the conveyance of moral truths. Shelby Giaccarini successfully defended a commonwealth thesis in which she maintained that literature might be an essential tool in disseminating the impulse to help fight anthropogenic climate change. These are all axiologic areas of interest. Is this where the utility of literature stops? My instinct is to deny this.
Literature can be and ought to be the medium of dissemination for more than just moral truths. The ability to engage and retain interest, the ability to stir emotion, these are tools useful to the forays of many different categories of thought. Describing and capturing a dynamic and elusive aspect of human nature may not be within the purview of philosophical discourse, though I suspect it can accomplish this as well. Literature, while not unique in any of its virtues, is an ideal candidate for the dissemination of many non moral claims.
Literature can be and ought to be the medium of dissemination for more than just moral truths. The ability to engage and retain interest, the ability to stir emotion, these are tools useful to the forays of many different categories of thought. Describing and capturing a dynamic and elusive aspect of human nature may not be within the purview of philosophical discourse, though I suspect it can accomplish this as well. Literature, while not unique in any of its virtues, is an ideal candidate for the dissemination of many non moral claims.
Catharsis
I realize that though I have been treating Monday night as the end of the week-end, due to the holiday, that it does not follow that the grading week should also be extended. Luckily, I caught myself in time.
Though not to the purpose of pleasing Aristotle, or Stacey for that matter, while we are discussing the value of literature, I thought I might once again throw in with those who contend a major value, though not the sole, of literature is its potential use as a cathartic medium. There is obviously, I think, a degree to which the strength and magnitude of an emotional release is lessened when it is the product of reading literature, even, I contend, non-fiction. Despite this, emotional releases of any degree of severity are essential to our mental well-being. The number of mechanisms by which we achieve this is quite large but one common medium, and effective, is that of literature.
Though not to the purpose of pleasing Aristotle, or Stacey for that matter, while we are discussing the value of literature, I thought I might once again throw in with those who contend a major value, though not the sole, of literature is its potential use as a cathartic medium. There is obviously, I think, a degree to which the strength and magnitude of an emotional release is lessened when it is the product of reading literature, even, I contend, non-fiction. Despite this, emotional releases of any degree of severity are essential to our mental well-being. The number of mechanisms by which we achieve this is quite large but one common medium, and effective, is that of literature.
Sunday, April 8, 2012
Writer or Author?
I understand we will be talking about this in class tomorrow, but I wanted to get some thoughts out there before. In class there was a distinction made between writer and author, a distinction, to be candid, I do not fully understand. As such, my comments are, more so than usual, an invitation for correction. It seemed clear that the writer was the person, the individual who composed the work in question. This includes, naturally, all the boring details of biological and biographical information. The author, I was slightly unclear about. I understand that Nehemas spoke of a postulated author as a hypothetical version of the writer that possessed the answers to all possible questions regarding the text. Is this the sole meaning of author we are using? Corey suggests that the author means: "the intentional agent who at the time of writing the work, has the motive of communicating something specific through the literary work." This seems to be a perfectly reasonable definition of author, but I fail to see how it should be distinct from the writer.
It seems that the distinction between writer and author is rather contrived and unhelpful.
It seems that the distinction between writer and author is rather contrived and unhelpful.
Infinity
There was some doubt as to whether or not there was an infinite number of descriptions of a pencil. This depends on a central question: Does an altered perspective, if there is no aesthetic difference, beget, necessarily, a distinct description? I think not. While the space around the pencil is infinitely divisible, the altered perspective of a fraction of a degree will not translate to a visible change. While we cognitively understand that we are viewing a different section of the pencil, we may not be able to articulate such a fine distinction in our actual description. Our senses are not so acutely honed; therefore, while there is an infinite number of perspectives from which descriptions and interpretations are begotten, there is a finite number of descriptions and interpretations.
Q&A 10 - Question 2: Contradiction
Does the nature of claims about literature differ in a significant enough manner to afford them the luxury of being able to accept contradictions, or are they held, also, to the logical restrictions of all other propositions?
Aristotle on non-contradiction: "It is impossible for the same thing to belong and not to belong at the same time to the same thing and in the same respect" (Metaphysics IV 3 1005b19-20). This is possibly the single most basic axiom of logic, and yet, it seems, interpretive pluralism denies this. According to the theory there is no one correct interpretation of a text and as such there can exist two contradictory interpretations that are equally correct? Either the nature of literary interpretation is significantly different than regular propositions, or interpretive pluralism is demonstrably false.
Is the nature of interpretation thus different?
Aristotle on non-contradiction: "It is impossible for the same thing to belong and not to belong at the same time to the same thing and in the same respect" (Metaphysics IV 3 1005b19-20). This is possibly the single most basic axiom of logic, and yet, it seems, interpretive pluralism denies this. According to the theory there is no one correct interpretation of a text and as such there can exist two contradictory interpretations that are equally correct? Either the nature of literary interpretation is significantly different than regular propositions, or interpretive pluralism is demonstrably false.
Is the nature of interpretation thus different?
Q&A 10 - Question 1: Interpretation
Must an interpretation attempt to explain the whole text or can an interpretation subsist merely on a selection from the text?
This question was begotten by a remarkable lack of clarification and specification as to what interpretation really is. More specifically, however, it was class discussion that really rendered necessary this inquiry. In objection to the hypothesis of an infinite number of perspectives from which to describe a pencil, someone said "well that would be describing a part of the pencil, not all of it." I wonder, though, if that is a reasonable distinction to make. If I were to say: "The cover of our textbook is teal." have I not described our textbook? Certainly a comprehensive description would go on to note that there are other colors, a certain number of pages...etc... The point is, though, that I did describe the textbook while describing only a part of it. Comprehensive interpretations may exist, though ambitious, but most interpretations are, I think, interpretations of parts of literary works.
This question was begotten by a remarkable lack of clarification and specification as to what interpretation really is. More specifically, however, it was class discussion that really rendered necessary this inquiry. In objection to the hypothesis of an infinite number of perspectives from which to describe a pencil, someone said "well that would be describing a part of the pencil, not all of it." I wonder, though, if that is a reasonable distinction to make. If I were to say: "The cover of our textbook is teal." have I not described our textbook? Certainly a comprehensive description would go on to note that there are other colors, a certain number of pages...etc... The point is, though, that I did describe the textbook while describing only a part of it. Comprehensive interpretations may exist, though ambitious, but most interpretations are, I think, interpretations of parts of literary works.
Saturday, March 31, 2012
Retrieval
Wollheim fails to either explicate the nature of a creative process or the manner by which we can reconstruct them. He fails to adequately respond to the first objection that it is impossible to recreate the creative process absent the fortunate circumstances of either being the artist (in which case interpretation would be unnecessary) or being privy to the artists process. Absent these extremely rare exceptions, I would maintain that it is impossible to recreate the creative process, but mainly because I am not presented with a definition, of any kind, of a creative process. Is it the mental thoughts while creating a piece? Maybe it is simply the mechanical operations of the artist's limbs while painting...etc...
Wollheim's thesis fails due to insufficient evidence.
Wollheim's thesis fails due to insufficient evidence.
Context
On Wednesday we discussed the merit of incorporating context of various sorts into interpretations and understanding of works of literature. There is merit but there is also danger. Understanding the tumultuous nature of France and England during that time aids in an understanding of A Tale of Two Cities.
However, I think we ought to be careful about which type of context can be helpful. There are certainly facts about an author's life for instance that would prove irrelevant. Furthermore, and the true danger, is that additional information can as easily corrupt as it can enlighten. Interpretation is always imprecise but being bogged down with irrelvant information may tempt us to look for analogs in the story and maybe even create a few.
However, I think we ought to be careful about which type of context can be helpful. There are certainly facts about an author's life for instance that would prove irrelevant. Furthermore, and the true danger, is that additional information can as easily corrupt as it can enlighten. Interpretation is always imprecise but being bogged down with irrelvant information may tempt us to look for analogs in the story and maybe even create a few.
The Correct Interpretation
I would like to posit that there is a correct interpretation of a work of literature. The correct intepretation of a work of literature is that which the author intended to communicate to the extent that it is not contradicted by the denotation of the work.
For instance: I cannot write a work "The Cat is Red" and then maintain that the correct intepretation of the work is that the cat is not red. If my intention was to convey that the cat is not red and attempt to do so by writing "the cat is red" than there is no correct interpretation because my intent and the denotation was contradictory. I would also maintain that I would be an idiot, but that is of less relevance here.
This is not to say that we cannot interpret material that the author did not intend. There is great merit in recognizing implications that may have arisen by accident, and there is nothing wrong with that. But the work means what the author meant it to mean.
Nota Bene: this is not the product of long deliberation and is very open to comment and revision.
For instance: I cannot write a work "The Cat is Red" and then maintain that the correct intepretation of the work is that the cat is not red. If my intention was to convey that the cat is not red and attempt to do so by writing "the cat is red" than there is no correct interpretation because my intent and the denotation was contradictory. I would also maintain that I would be an idiot, but that is of less relevance here.
This is not to say that we cannot interpret material that the author did not intend. There is great merit in recognizing implications that may have arisen by accident, and there is nothing wrong with that. But the work means what the author meant it to mean.
Nota Bene: this is not the product of long deliberation and is very open to comment and revision.
Paradox?
Nehamas, early in the article, attempts to invoke paradox to counter the view of Corngold. "But of course Corngold's view is reached thorugh an interpretation which must be itself correct if it is to explain why there cannot be a correct intepretation of the story."
This is a valid counterpoint, and a paradox indeed. He continues: and this paradox of method is parallel to a paradox of content. He claims that if the point of Metamorphosis was that literature cannot succeed in conveyance then a paradox occurs. "But if it succeeds in communicating it, it communicates that it fails to communicate..." Again, a valid paradox and thus refutation, but then he steps slightly too far: "...and if it fails, since this failure is what it communicates, it succeeds." He is close here,a nd I undersatnd why he errs, but an error noneltheless. If the story fails to communicate that literature cannot communicate, this does not prove that literate cannot communicate; it is only that this one case failed, so it does not ultimately succeed and there is no paradox there. It is a subtle distinction, but a valid one. Indeed, Goldcorn's position falls victim to the first two paradoxes, but Nehamas is not entitled to the third.
This is a valid counterpoint, and a paradox indeed. He continues: and this paradox of method is parallel to a paradox of content. He claims that if the point of Metamorphosis was that literature cannot succeed in conveyance then a paradox occurs. "But if it succeeds in communicating it, it communicates that it fails to communicate..." Again, a valid paradox and thus refutation, but then he steps slightly too far: "...and if it fails, since this failure is what it communicates, it succeeds." He is close here,a nd I undersatnd why he errs, but an error noneltheless. If the story fails to communicate that literature cannot communicate, this does not prove that literate cannot communicate; it is only that this one case failed, so it does not ultimately succeed and there is no paradox there. It is a subtle distinction, but a valid one. Indeed, Goldcorn's position falls victim to the first two paradoxes, but Nehamas is not entitled to the third.
Friday, March 9, 2012
Chapter 9
I found while rereading Moby Dick this last time, a new fascination with Chapter Nine: The Sermon. I wonder what role the preacher and, more importantly, the sermon plays in the narrative. Two lines in particular stuck out to me.
The first was the last lesson the sermon was supposed to teach: "To preach the truth to the face of Falsehood." This echos somewhat one of the things Melville bemoaned in a letter to Hawthorne: that writers cannot tell the truth to their readers and expect success. One possibility was that this was Melville injecting some of his preference into the story through this sermon.
The second was the idea that Jonah thought his punishment just and was grateful for it. The idea of being grateful for punishment is rather alien, but on further reflection, punishment, when effectively employed can serve as an educational tool. The punishee may not be grateful at the time but they may be in the future. Jonah understood his actions were wrong and thus the punishment did not anger him. It is a lesson we all could learn and be better for.
I'm interested; what role do you think the sermon played in the narrative?
The first was the last lesson the sermon was supposed to teach: "To preach the truth to the face of Falsehood." This echos somewhat one of the things Melville bemoaned in a letter to Hawthorne: that writers cannot tell the truth to their readers and expect success. One possibility was that this was Melville injecting some of his preference into the story through this sermon.
The second was the idea that Jonah thought his punishment just and was grateful for it. The idea of being grateful for punishment is rather alien, but on further reflection, punishment, when effectively employed can serve as an educational tool. The punishee may not be grateful at the time but they may be in the future. Jonah understood his actions were wrong and thus the punishment did not anger him. It is a lesson we all could learn and be better for.
I'm interested; what role do you think the sermon played in the narrative?
Ishmael as Reformed
Sarah Ott describes Ishmael as a conservative puritan. While Ishmael does identify himself as a puritan, I think there are numerous textual references that stand as significant evidence against his conservatism.
Ismael once prays, with Queequeg, to an Idol. This is a charitable interpretation of the bible, not a hallmark of a conservative christian.
In reference to Queequeg, Ishmael, on page 57 says: "I'll try a pagan friend, thought I, since Christian kindness has proved but hollow courtesy." Not only does he willingly befriend a pagan, but the self critical view of Christianity is almost exclusively not a quality found in a conservative.
Again, near the beginning of chapter seventeen, Ismael decides not to interrupt Queequeg's Ramadan because Christians ought not disturb anyone's manner of worship and that Christians ought not feel religiously superior to any others. Such religious superiority is certainly often the viewpoint of conservative Christians.
Ismael once prays, with Queequeg, to an Idol. This is a charitable interpretation of the bible, not a hallmark of a conservative christian.
In reference to Queequeg, Ishmael, on page 57 says: "I'll try a pagan friend, thought I, since Christian kindness has proved but hollow courtesy." Not only does he willingly befriend a pagan, but the self critical view of Christianity is almost exclusively not a quality found in a conservative.
Again, near the beginning of chapter seventeen, Ismael decides not to interrupt Queequeg's Ramadan because Christians ought not disturb anyone's manner of worship and that Christians ought not feel religiously superior to any others. Such religious superiority is certainly often the viewpoint of conservative Christians.
Wednesday, March 7, 2012
Of Ott Paradoxes
I voiced in class on monday the idea that Ott was speaking, at most, of mere contradictions and, at least, unimportant tensions. As such, I was contending that the use of the term 'paradox' was incorrect. We settled the issue by claiming that ascribing contradictory discriptors to a single entity would constitute a paradox. What we missed was a line on page 28, a line that should have been articulated on page 1: "Melville's important contribution to both the novel's theme and structure is this counterbalancing of opposing tensions - what I have called paradoxes" (28). So a paradox, stipulated by Ott is merely an opposing tension. This is an understanding of this essay and of Melville that is more satisfactory to me. Properly, again, she ought to have mentioned this from the start and not more than half way through her paper, but it is revealing nonetheless.
Wednesday, February 22, 2012
The Pursuit of Literature
I voiced, today, the possibility, indeed proffered the hypothesis, that writers of literature and writers of philisophical discourse have distinct ends. The philosopher aims at truth while the novelist aims at the aesthetic. I used the term 'entertaining' today and I wish to recant that; it was an incorrect term. The novelist may be trying to convey an important concept, he might be trying even to get at the truth, but once she has chosen the form of literature as his medium, she commits himself to producing a work that is aesthetically pleasing. The aesthetic pleasure is an essential goal of the form.
Therefore, the use of metaphor and the laudability thereof is also distinct. It is my contention that the metaphor adds no meaning and is mostly an aestheticconsideration. Now, aesthetic considerations are extremely important but much more important for the novelist than the philosopher. I actually think that philosophers should pay some more attention to the aesthetic but not at the price of obscurity.
Therefore, the use of metaphor and the laudability thereof is also distinct. It is my contention that the metaphor adds no meaning and is mostly an aestheticconsideration. Now, aesthetic considerations are extremely important but much more important for the novelist than the philosopher. I actually think that philosophers should pay some more attention to the aesthetic but not at the price of obscurity.
Q&A Question 2: Do Metaphors Exist?
If a metaphor meant merely what the literal words meant, then would metaphors exist?
This question attempts to take seriously the thesis of Davidson's paper. "This paper is concerned with what metaphors mean, and its thesis is that metaphors mean what the words, in their most literal interpretation, mean, and nothing more."
Davidsom acknowledges that this is controversial and is contrary to much, if not all, of previous opinion on the matter. As long as Davidson accepts that a phrase such as "Richard is a lion" is actually a metaphor, it is difficult to understand how he defends his position. All people who utter metaphors are merely mistaken? Metaphors become mere falsehoods. Literal prose and metaphors become one and the same; metaphors, as distinct linguistic entities cease to be.
This question attempts to take seriously the thesis of Davidson's paper. "This paper is concerned with what metaphors mean, and its thesis is that metaphors mean what the words, in their most literal interpretation, mean, and nothing more."
Davidsom acknowledges that this is controversial and is contrary to much, if not all, of previous opinion on the matter. As long as Davidson accepts that a phrase such as "Richard is a lion" is actually a metaphor, it is difficult to understand how he defends his position. All people who utter metaphors are merely mistaken? Metaphors become mere falsehoods. Literal prose and metaphors become one and the same; metaphors, as distinct linguistic entities cease to be.
Q&A Question 1: Metaphors in Philosophy
If metaphors are not only ornamental but can augment the impact of meaning, thought not semantically, would it then be acceptable to use metaphors in philosophical discourse?
My question from the q&a depends on my argument that while metaphors can be translated to purely literal language, that is that they do not introduce any unique semantic meaning, they still possess an twofold import that literal language lacks. The second half of the import is increased potency; metaphors, as with most indirect communication, has the potential to render the meaning of the metaphor more potent and longer lasting. A smartly crafted metaphor will have more impact.
Now, if this is true, which I do think so, there may be some venerable reasons to employ metaphors in philosophical discourse. I chose philosophical discourse as it is my discipline and the discipline of this seminar, but it may hold true for other academic writing as well.
So the question is: does the increased impact provide a benefit enough to override the inherent imprecision of a metaphor?
My question from the q&a depends on my argument that while metaphors can be translated to purely literal language, that is that they do not introduce any unique semantic meaning, they still possess an twofold import that literal language lacks. The second half of the import is increased potency; metaphors, as with most indirect communication, has the potential to render the meaning of the metaphor more potent and longer lasting. A smartly crafted metaphor will have more impact.
Now, if this is true, which I do think so, there may be some venerable reasons to employ metaphors in philosophical discourse. I chose philosophical discourse as it is my discipline and the discipline of this seminar, but it may hold true for other academic writing as well.
So the question is: does the increased impact provide a benefit enough to override the inherent imprecision of a metaphor?
The Pursuit of Ethics
Brett asked about the role of emotion in the philosophical pursuit of ethics. It is a fascinating question and one I wish to address.
Philosophy is often errantly conceived of as reason to the extent of existing as a wholly non-emotional discipline. This is, strictly, incorrect. Emotions are ever present and it would be foolish to deny it; the question then becomes an issue of how best to deal with the emotions. The problem, if it needs stating, is that emotions are, to some degree (less than is often thought), non-cognitive, or not regulated by reason. Therefore, in any attempt to arrive at the truth, non-reasonable entities are seen as a liability.
I want to distinguish between writing or thinking emotionally and writing or thinking about emotion. Philosophers would be neglegent to neglect the role emotions do play in making ethical decisions. As such emotions must be the subject of much philosophical discourse. On the other hand, emotions probably ought not be used in the formulation of ethical theory.
That having been said, I am not of the opinion that philosophical discourse must be dry, direct...etc... Emotional discourse can be included without too much trouble I think but only as augmentation, in addition to the reason, never in lieu thereof.
Philosophy is often errantly conceived of as reason to the extent of existing as a wholly non-emotional discipline. This is, strictly, incorrect. Emotions are ever present and it would be foolish to deny it; the question then becomes an issue of how best to deal with the emotions. The problem, if it needs stating, is that emotions are, to some degree (less than is often thought), non-cognitive, or not regulated by reason. Therefore, in any attempt to arrive at the truth, non-reasonable entities are seen as a liability.
I want to distinguish between writing or thinking emotionally and writing or thinking about emotion. Philosophers would be neglegent to neglect the role emotions do play in making ethical decisions. As such emotions must be the subject of much philosophical discourse. On the other hand, emotions probably ought not be used in the formulation of ethical theory.
That having been said, I am not of the opinion that philosophical discourse must be dry, direct...etc... Emotional discourse can be included without too much trouble I think but only as augmentation, in addition to the reason, never in lieu thereof.
Sunday, February 19, 2012
On the Acceptance of Masochism
Why do we enjoy reading tragedy in literature, who do we pursue melancholy and sadness in music?
This question is typically posed while denying that many people are inherently masochistic and as often as that is denied the affirmative solution of catharsis is proffered. We also read an account of this problem with responses and meta-responses. I think the use of meta-responses was very clever and likely to be true. I am merely contending that catharsis and masochism fit into that paradigm. Masochism is the practice of deriving pleasure from pain, in its most basic form. If the response is painful and sad, and then the meta-response, because the bad emotions were just catharticly removed, is positive, there is an accounting which synthesizes masochism, catharsis, and the meta-response.
This question is typically posed while denying that many people are inherently masochistic and as often as that is denied the affirmative solution of catharsis is proffered. We also read an account of this problem with responses and meta-responses. I think the use of meta-responses was very clever and likely to be true. I am merely contending that catharsis and masochism fit into that paradigm. Masochism is the practice of deriving pleasure from pain, in its most basic form. If the response is painful and sad, and then the meta-response, because the bad emotions were just catharticly removed, is positive, there is an accounting which synthesizes masochism, catharsis, and the meta-response.
Q&A Question 2: Characters
How important to our emotional reactions to fiction are the specifics of the characters?
This question affords me to opportunity to explicate my proffered solution to the paradox of fiction that I attempted, poorly, to articulate on Wednesday. As my question suggests, I think we are too focused on the characters of a story. Mistake me not, the characters are important to our emotional reaction, but what is irrelevant is the fact that they do not exist.
If the leg of a real sea captain, a captain whom we know, is removed by a large white whale, we would react with a certain emotion. This event has a certain form to it: Person (P)who we care about (PC)is harmed (H) in a particular way. (I understand this is a drastic oversimplification but it shall suffice for our purposes.) It is this concept that we are reacting to; (PC) is (H) and to this there is a corresponding emotional reaction. Nota Bene: if it was not someone we cared about, but rather merely (P) is (H) then the reaction, and the concept, would be different.
When we read Moby Dick, we encounter Ahab (P) and because Melville writes it so, we begin to care about him (PC) and then he is harmed in a particular way (H) and so the form is the same: (PC) is (H). We react to the form of the concept, not to the reality of the characters.
This question affords me to opportunity to explicate my proffered solution to the paradox of fiction that I attempted, poorly, to articulate on Wednesday. As my question suggests, I think we are too focused on the characters of a story. Mistake me not, the characters are important to our emotional reaction, but what is irrelevant is the fact that they do not exist.
If the leg of a real sea captain, a captain whom we know, is removed by a large white whale, we would react with a certain emotion. This event has a certain form to it: Person (P)who we care about (PC)is harmed (H) in a particular way. (I understand this is a drastic oversimplification but it shall suffice for our purposes.) It is this concept that we are reacting to; (PC) is (H) and to this there is a corresponding emotional reaction. Nota Bene: if it was not someone we cared about, but rather merely (P) is (H) then the reaction, and the concept, would be different.
When we read Moby Dick, we encounter Ahab (P) and because Melville writes it so, we begin to care about him (PC) and then he is harmed in a particular way (H) and so the form is the same: (PC) is (H). We react to the form of the concept, not to the reality of the characters.
Q&A Question 1: The Rationality of Emotions
To what extent can emotional reactions, responses that are largely non-cognitive, be rational or irrational?
This question is obviously begotten by Radford's acceptance of the fiction paradox thus rendering our emotional reactions to fiction irrational. I take as axiomatic that emotional reactions generally, but especially in response to fiction, are not actions of volition. If this is true, then the lack of will involved would seem to indicate that emotional processes are, at least partially, non-cognitive. For something to be irrational, or for that matter rational, it must be the product, or potentially the product, of reason and thought. If emotions are not processes of volition, then they are not the potential product of reason and thought and therefore cannot be irrational.
Are my premises true? Are emotional processes largely non-cognitive? Does it follow from this that they cannot be irrational?
This question is obviously begotten by Radford's acceptance of the fiction paradox thus rendering our emotional reactions to fiction irrational. I take as axiomatic that emotional reactions generally, but especially in response to fiction, are not actions of volition. If this is true, then the lack of will involved would seem to indicate that emotional processes are, at least partially, non-cognitive. For something to be irrational, or for that matter rational, it must be the product, or potentially the product, of reason and thought. If emotions are not processes of volition, then they are not the potential product of reason and thought and therefore cannot be irrational.
Are my premises true? Are emotional processes largely non-cognitive? Does it follow from this that they cannot be irrational?
Sunday, February 12, 2012
Games of Fiction
Brett asked on Friday, in reference to Walton, whether, according to him, fiction was the game played or the product of playing the game. I wanted to offer my opinion on this interesting question. However, as a preface, I would like to assert the obscurity of Walton's prose as the genesis of any and all confusion herein.
The game itself, whether or not the game is actually fiction, occurs when someone engages with a prop. Walton is atypically explicit in that the prop is not the work of fiction. I am tempted to claim that fiction is an entity which is the product of engaging with a prop that incites the imagination. Again, this is not my definition of fiction; I think that Walton, and the others, over complicate the issue. Within the confines of Walton's theory it seems more likely that fiction is the product and not the game.
Question: Is there a significant, in any way, metaphysical difference between ghe two aforementioned options?
The game itself, whether or not the game is actually fiction, occurs when someone engages with a prop. Walton is atypically explicit in that the prop is not the work of fiction. I am tempted to claim that fiction is an entity which is the product of engaging with a prop that incites the imagination. Again, this is not my definition of fiction; I think that Walton, and the others, over complicate the issue. Within the confines of Walton's theory it seems more likely that fiction is the product and not the game.
Question: Is there a significant, in any way, metaphysical difference between ghe two aforementioned options?
Friday, February 10, 2012
Fiction Q&A Question 2
Question 2: Is a stylistically altered account of a real event fictional?
From all the conceptualizations of fiction that I have read and encountered include some form of falsity. The events of the narrative must be, to at least some degree representational of things that did not happen. My question is at what degree of separation from reality is an account said to be fictional? I would be tempted to claim that even the slightest alteration would render it false and therefore fictional. However, just stylistic renderings, poetic language and advanced diction, do not render such things fictional, although I admit it may be difficult to effectively use such language and remain completely true to the facts.
From all the conceptualizations of fiction that I have read and encountered include some form of falsity. The events of the narrative must be, to at least some degree representational of things that did not happen. My question is at what degree of separation from reality is an account said to be fictional? I would be tempted to claim that even the slightest alteration would render it false and therefore fictional. However, just stylistic renderings, poetic language and advanced diction, do not render such things fictional, although I admit it may be difficult to effectively use such language and remain completely true to the facts.
Fiction Q&A Question 1
Q&A Question One: Why cannot an assertion, a la Searle, be a lie?
Searle enumerated many necessary conditions for an illocutionary act to be an assertion, and amongst them he placed the condition that the utterer of the act must believe the truthfulness of the claim. I would be more than ready to accept this as a stipulation if but we were given an adequate claim, but with my admittedly insufficient reading, encountered no such defense.
It seems to me that there is a sensible manner in which we can talk about not only a false assertion but an assertion that is a lie. In the face of the paucity of reason to not consider this plausible I must assume it is.
Question: Is there a reason to think, other than the completion of his pet theory, that we should forgo the thought of a statement that is both an assertion and a lie.
Searle enumerated many necessary conditions for an illocutionary act to be an assertion, and amongst them he placed the condition that the utterer of the act must believe the truthfulness of the claim. I would be more than ready to accept this as a stipulation if but we were given an adequate claim, but with my admittedly insufficient reading, encountered no such defense.
It seems to me that there is a sensible manner in which we can talk about not only a false assertion but an assertion that is a lie. In the face of the paucity of reason to not consider this plausible I must assume it is.
Question: Is there a reason to think, other than the completion of his pet theory, that we should forgo the thought of a statement that is both an assertion and a lie.
Wednesday, February 1, 2012
Literature, Poetry, and Drama
I have been wondering, lately, about the position of poetry relative to that of literature. Specifically, I am curious as to whether I would be right to separate the two forms as distinct or to include poetry as a form of literature. The Greeks seemed to do the latter; poetry, drama, rhetoric, could all be subsumed, in some dialects, under the term literature. (Strictly, philologia translates to 'love of discourse' but was one term used to describe ficitonalized writings of all types.)
My precritical intuition was, though, to do the former. To classify poetry as its own art distinct from literature, distinct from drama. While attempting to define literature in my previous post, a post I suggest looking at, I could find, despite myself, no reason to exclude poetry or drama (the script rather than the production of course). They both satisfied all the conditions I had reason to enumerate for literature. I do not deny the possibility that a poem may not satisfy my last criterion, but generally, I think, they do.
Where does poetry and drama fall in relation to literature?
My precritical intuition was, though, to do the former. To classify poetry as its own art distinct from literature, distinct from drama. While attempting to define literature in my previous post, a post I suggest looking at, I could find, despite myself, no reason to exclude poetry or drama (the script rather than the production of course). They both satisfied all the conditions I had reason to enumerate for literature. I do not deny the possibility that a poem may not satisfy my last criterion, but generally, I think, they do.
Where does poetry and drama fall in relation to literature?
Literature Defined
This is Philosophy and Literature. We are two weeks into the semester and we have yet to define one of, if not the single one, key terms: literature. Obviously the question of whether or not it is definable comes first. I am assuming for reasons I make elsewhere, that it is. The correct follow up to my point would then be a proffering of a plausible definition. As an important annotation, this is extremely rough and therefore in need of much refinement.
Literature is an art form; the potential problems begotten by this classification are only actualized with a narrow, truncated conceptualization of the aesthetic which I do not share. This is important as it necessarily subsumes all the necessary conditions for art under the conditions for literature. Art, stipulatively, is the creation of an object through the use of an aesthetic medium with the intent to convey and embody a concept or emotion.
Literature is an art form, the medium of which is language. Unlike the musician whose medium is sound, the painter whose is paint, the medium of the author, of the poet, is language.
Literature is an art form, the medium of which is language, and that possesses, by virtue of syntax and semantics, a coherent narrative.
Therefore, a work of literature is an object created through the use of the medium of language, with the intent to convey and embody a concept or emotion, that possesses by virtue of its syntax and its semantics, a coherent narrative.
Literature:
1) An object
2) Consisting of Language
3) With the intent to convey and embody a concept or emotion
4) Coherent Narrative
Note that I remain silent on qualitative conditions, though I suspect, perhaps, that parsing 'coherent' may beget criteria of quality.
Thoughts?
Literature is an art form; the potential problems begotten by this classification are only actualized with a narrow, truncated conceptualization of the aesthetic which I do not share. This is important as it necessarily subsumes all the necessary conditions for art under the conditions for literature. Art, stipulatively, is the creation of an object through the use of an aesthetic medium with the intent to convey and embody a concept or emotion.
Literature is an art form, the medium of which is language. Unlike the musician whose medium is sound, the painter whose is paint, the medium of the author, of the poet, is language.
Literature is an art form, the medium of which is language, and that possesses, by virtue of syntax and semantics, a coherent narrative.
Therefore, a work of literature is an object created through the use of the medium of language, with the intent to convey and embody a concept or emotion, that possesses by virtue of its syntax and its semantics, a coherent narrative.
Literature:
1) An object
2) Consisting of Language
3) With the intent to convey and embody a concept or emotion
4) Coherent Narrative
Note that I remain silent on qualitative conditions, though I suspect, perhaps, that parsing 'coherent' may beget criteria of quality.
Thoughts?
Tuesday, January 31, 2012
Definitions
Q&A Question: Is the role of a definition to describe the current usage or to normatively prescribe usage?
There are many types of definitions; there are lexical definitions which do nothing more than report the usage of the term. I would, actually, plead for another term to call such things; definitions have the connotations of being clear, and common usage, and therefore lexical accounts, are often not.
Definitions that we are interested in are not mere accounts of usage, but stipulative aids to understanding. The role, therefore, I think is to normatively prescribe usage. Indeed, as was made abundantly clear last class, the prescription cannot be arbitrary; there must be reasons for the discriminations of the definiens, as all definitions do discriminate. For instance, the reason that Literature can be oral is because language can be oral and the content of literature is language. Definitions ought to be normative prescriptions. To define 'x' is to describe what we should be meaning when we use the term 'x'.
I'll tempt this: my defintion of art is the creation of an object through the use of an aesthetic medium with the intent to convey and embody a concept or emotion. Therefore, it is my opinion that only when referring to such objects ought we to use the term 'art'.
There are many types of definitions; there are lexical definitions which do nothing more than report the usage of the term. I would, actually, plead for another term to call such things; definitions have the connotations of being clear, and common usage, and therefore lexical accounts, are often not.
Definitions that we are interested in are not mere accounts of usage, but stipulative aids to understanding. The role, therefore, I think is to normatively prescribe usage. Indeed, as was made abundantly clear last class, the prescription cannot be arbitrary; there must be reasons for the discriminations of the definiens, as all definitions do discriminate. For instance, the reason that Literature can be oral is because language can be oral and the content of literature is language. Definitions ought to be normative prescriptions. To define 'x' is to describe what we should be meaning when we use the term 'x'.
I'll tempt this: my defintion of art is the creation of an object through the use of an aesthetic medium with the intent to convey and embody a concept or emotion. Therefore, it is my opinion that only when referring to such objects ought we to use the term 'art'.
Educated Natives
Q&A question: Is the usage of the native speaker the final measure of a definition, or can native speakers, as with everyone else, be wrong?
The specter of the Educated Native Speaker was raised both by Hirsch and in class. The claim was something to the effect that any definition must accomodate the usage of the definiendum by the educated native speaker. This strikes me as patently false, as an educated native speaker is not infallible and may be incorrect. My calling a table a pig should not alter the definitions of either of those terms, despite the fact that I am a native speaker of English and am relatively well educated.
To this Tom objected, not verbatim of course, that it is insufficient for a single native speaker, but if educated native speakers as a whole use the term a certain way than the definition ought to accomodate this. He is partially correct; Hirsch did not have in mind my single wrong speaker example. But I still think the my general objection holds. Definitions of words ought to possess both clarity and utility. If, as a whole, the mass of educated english speakers began conflating two terms, say Argument and Inference (not too far fetched as they are closely related, but importantly not synonymous) we would be within our right to correct them and define the inference as the move from premises to a conclusion within an argument.
The specter of the Educated Native Speaker was raised both by Hirsch and in class. The claim was something to the effect that any definition must accomodate the usage of the definiendum by the educated native speaker. This strikes me as patently false, as an educated native speaker is not infallible and may be incorrect. My calling a table a pig should not alter the definitions of either of those terms, despite the fact that I am a native speaker of English and am relatively well educated.
To this Tom objected, not verbatim of course, that it is insufficient for a single native speaker, but if educated native speakers as a whole use the term a certain way than the definition ought to accomodate this. He is partially correct; Hirsch did not have in mind my single wrong speaker example. But I still think the my general objection holds. Definitions of words ought to possess both clarity and utility. If, as a whole, the mass of educated english speakers began conflating two terms, say Argument and Inference (not too far fetched as they are closely related, but importantly not synonymous) we would be within our right to correct them and define the inference as the move from premises to a conclusion within an argument.
Wednesday, January 25, 2012
The Moral Medium
Corey mentioned as a comment on an earlier post of mine: "I would not concede that there is an objectively better way to represent a claim, in any certain form."
I initially agreed with him but the more time I spent thinking about it, I became less and less sure until I arrived at the conclusion that there is, I think, better mediums for certain types of claims. I'll begin with what I consider to be the more obvious and move to the more contentious:
"Atoms have mass." Here is a comment for which there is one best medium. While it may be interesting to read a novel that somehow makes this claim intriguing and bases upon it a novel, this claim needs to be clearly explained and the supporting research needs to be provided. This is the expectation in the scientific community, and rightly so: such claims need to be tested.
"Theft is wrong." Moral philosophy, the subject of Nussbaum's introduction does, I think, have a best medium: dialogue. Dialogue synthesis literture's ease of reading with the philisophical rigor of a treatise prose. It allows characters to challenge other views and presuppositions providing a more natural venue for the exploration and defense of claims and supporting claims. To maintain that theft is wrong, perhaps it may be necessary to develop a fully robust moral theory with specific that would likely be lost is a work of literature.
An idea I am taken with is similar to the strategy Matthew Silliman used. He wrote "Sentience and Sensibility: a Conversation of Moral Philosophy" as a dialogue and then, as an appendix, included an essay he co-authored with Professor Johnson articulating, exactly, the moral theory.
I initially agreed with him but the more time I spent thinking about it, I became less and less sure until I arrived at the conclusion that there is, I think, better mediums for certain types of claims. I'll begin with what I consider to be the more obvious and move to the more contentious:
"Atoms have mass." Here is a comment for which there is one best medium. While it may be interesting to read a novel that somehow makes this claim intriguing and bases upon it a novel, this claim needs to be clearly explained and the supporting research needs to be provided. This is the expectation in the scientific community, and rightly so: such claims need to be tested.
"Theft is wrong." Moral philosophy, the subject of Nussbaum's introduction does, I think, have a best medium: dialogue. Dialogue synthesis literture's ease of reading with the philisophical rigor of a treatise prose. It allows characters to challenge other views and presuppositions providing a more natural venue for the exploration and defense of claims and supporting claims. To maintain that theft is wrong, perhaps it may be necessary to develop a fully robust moral theory with specific that would likely be lost is a work of literature.
An idea I am taken with is similar to the strategy Matthew Silliman used. He wrote "Sentience and Sensibility: a Conversation of Moral Philosophy" as a dialogue and then, as an appendix, included an essay he co-authored with Professor Johnson articulating, exactly, the moral theory.
Degrees of Literature
I am surprised, actually, that it took me until my fifth post to ask this question: what is literature?
The reason I ask is because if we are to maintain that literature is the best medium for ethical philosophy, we are going to need to understand what, exactly, literature is. One of my q&a questions, for example, is how literary does a work have to be? There may be degrees of literature: Republic is likely less literary than The Brothers Karamazov, but, again, likely more literary than Locke's "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding." Or is literature a binary classification?
So,
What is Literature?
To what degree, if it is a vague quality, must a work be literary?
The reason I ask is because if we are to maintain that literature is the best medium for ethical philosophy, we are going to need to understand what, exactly, literature is. One of my q&a questions, for example, is how literary does a work have to be? There may be degrees of literature: Republic is likely less literary than The Brothers Karamazov, but, again, likely more literary than Locke's "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding." Or is literature a binary classification?
So,
What is Literature?
To what degree, if it is a vague quality, must a work be literary?
Literature as Moral Medium?
Nussbaum is maintaining that literature is the best medium for investigating and conveying ethical philosophy.
I think that for the virtues of literature there is typically a corresponding vice: Articulating the ineffable occurs, when it does, at the price of precision; increased effect and import is bought at the cost of unreliablilty. While identifying a specific metaphor as being about other metaphors may be done with a certain degree of certainty, well written literature, as a rule, is less clear than a well written treatise. Using indirect communication can be powerful when it is successful, but the successful transfer of information is less reliable than straight forward prose.
I think great literature often has great philisophical ideas. This may be even the reason the literature is great. For more on this, I believe it is the topic of Nicole's next year Commonwealth Thesis. My contention is that I am not sure literature is the best medium for ethical philosophy.
I think that for the virtues of literature there is typically a corresponding vice: Articulating the ineffable occurs, when it does, at the price of precision; increased effect and import is bought at the cost of unreliablilty. While identifying a specific metaphor as being about other metaphors may be done with a certain degree of certainty, well written literature, as a rule, is less clear than a well written treatise. Using indirect communication can be powerful when it is successful, but the successful transfer of information is less reliable than straight forward prose.
I think great literature often has great philisophical ideas. This may be even the reason the literature is great. For more on this, I believe it is the topic of Nicole's next year Commonwealth Thesis. My contention is that I am not sure literature is the best medium for ethical philosophy.
Monday, January 23, 2012
Nussbaum's Novel Notion
There is a question that will inevitably arise, and for good reason: it is a potent question. Why did not Nussbaum write this in narrative form?
She maintains that literature is the best fit for investigating and answering questions about how one ought to lead his or her life. Such investigating and answering is actually an act of life, and therefore, to prescribe the best method to investigate how to live your life is actually to prescribe, minimally, how to live your life. Nussbaum is not using narrative; why not? Her hypocrisy, if it is indeed hypocrisy, runs one layer deeper. She, in the first section, actually calls hypocritical any author who would maintain literature as the appropriate medium for conveying truths and then writes a "treatise." I am lost in this Escher-like labyrinth of hypocrisy and inconsistency.
I do not mean this as an attack. Nussbaum argues, if not convincingly, spiritedly that literature is the better medium for this material; why then, does she not write in it?
She maintains that literature is the best fit for investigating and answering questions about how one ought to lead his or her life. Such investigating and answering is actually an act of life, and therefore, to prescribe the best method to investigate how to live your life is actually to prescribe, minimally, how to live your life. Nussbaum is not using narrative; why not? Her hypocrisy, if it is indeed hypocrisy, runs one layer deeper. She, in the first section, actually calls hypocritical any author who would maintain literature as the appropriate medium for conveying truths and then writes a "treatise." I am lost in this Escher-like labyrinth of hypocrisy and inconsistency.
I do not mean this as an attack. Nussbaum argues, if not convincingly, spiritedly that literature is the better medium for this material; why then, does she not write in it?
Thursday, January 19, 2012
Agnostic Apology
In the true spirit of the agnostic, I do not know if this will be an adequate point to address. From the tool-kit: "Atheism and Theism are (mostly) metaphysical claims, the one denying and the other affirming the existence of God. Agnosticism is the (mostly) epistemological claim that the question is undecidable on the basis of present evidence."
These characterizations of atheism and theism are essentially correct. Agnosticism is, yes, the mostly epistemological claim that the question is undecidable. I do not agree with the connotations of stating that the reason for the agnostic's assertion is on the basis of present evidence. The position of the agnostic is not begotten by a lack of evidence, but rather by the definition of god. An omnipotent being exceeds our ability to understand. The very logic of such a concept denotes an inability for us to understand and therefore, ever know. It is not that there is some seemingly mundane gap in evidence that may be bridged with a few more years of space exploration; it is that the very nature of god is not subject to any of our tools of knowledge. It is in this way that the agnostic and atheist are distinct.
These characterizations of atheism and theism are essentially correct. Agnosticism is, yes, the mostly epistemological claim that the question is undecidable. I do not agree with the connotations of stating that the reason for the agnostic's assertion is on the basis of present evidence. The position of the agnostic is not begotten by a lack of evidence, but rather by the definition of god. An omnipotent being exceeds our ability to understand. The very logic of such a concept denotes an inability for us to understand and therefore, ever know. It is not that there is some seemingly mundane gap in evidence that may be bridged with a few more years of space exploration; it is that the very nature of god is not subject to any of our tools of knowledge. It is in this way that the agnostic and atheist are distinct.
Explication of Self
My name is Jacob Wheeler. I am a senior Philosophy major and as my enrollment in this class may indicate I have a fondness for great literature. That's enough about me:
Someone asked in class yesterday if there was any value in this assignment. The point is potent; we will likely forget these facts (the ones we even read) and there may be little benefit gained here. I'd like to offer a counter point. Posting and reading these brusquely brief bios is a humanizing activity. It reminds all agents participating in these discussions that the views we are responding to are the views of people; it reinforces possibly one of the most fundamental aspects of a free flow of ideas: courtesy and respect.
Question: do you find any value in this assignment or is it, as suggested in class, a waste of time?
Someone asked in class yesterday if there was any value in this assignment. The point is potent; we will likely forget these facts (the ones we even read) and there may be little benefit gained here. I'd like to offer a counter point. Posting and reading these brusquely brief bios is a humanizing activity. It reminds all agents participating in these discussions that the views we are responding to are the views of people; it reinforces possibly one of the most fundamental aspects of a free flow of ideas: courtesy and respect.
Question: do you find any value in this assignment or is it, as suggested in class, a waste of time?
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