Pihlstrom claims that feeling guilt, or at least the ability to do so, is fundamentally necessary to our ability to employ ethical concepts or judgments. His rationale for this is that without guilt we could not experience responsibility, the seat for ethical decisions.
My question then, naturally, is whether or not this is true. Is guilt necessary to employing ethical concepts?
My hypothesis is no. They are difficult to separate: there are very few people who operate without any sense or ability to feel guilt. So there is the empirical fact that the faculty of guilt so often accompanies the faculty to perform moral reasoning. This is insufficient though to prove a connection as strong as Pihlstrom is hinting at. Our moral reasoning is not a product of what makes us feel bad or good; at least it ought not be. Sure, immoral actions will often lead to a sense of guilt; this does not necessitate that guilt is necessary to moral reasoning. Our moral reasoning ought to be predicated by moral principles that can be rationally derived.
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