Brett asked about the role of emotion in the philosophical pursuit of ethics. It is a fascinating question and one I wish to address.
Philosophy is often errantly conceived of as reason to the extent of existing as a wholly non-emotional discipline. This is, strictly, incorrect. Emotions are ever present and it would be foolish to deny it; the question then becomes an issue of how best to deal with the emotions. The problem, if it needs stating, is that emotions are, to some degree (less than is often thought), non-cognitive, or not regulated by reason. Therefore, in any attempt to arrive at the truth, non-reasonable entities are seen as a liability.
I want to distinguish between writing or thinking emotionally and writing or thinking about emotion. Philosophers would be neglegent to neglect the role emotions do play in making ethical decisions. As such emotions must be the subject of much philosophical discourse. On the other hand, emotions probably ought not be used in the formulation of ethical theory.
That having been said, I am not of the opinion that philosophical discourse must be dry, direct...etc... Emotional discourse can be included without too much trouble I think but only as augmentation, in addition to the reason, never in lieu thereof.
Wednesday, February 22, 2012
Sunday, February 19, 2012
On the Acceptance of Masochism
Why do we enjoy reading tragedy in literature, who do we pursue melancholy and sadness in music?
This question is typically posed while denying that many people are inherently masochistic and as often as that is denied the affirmative solution of catharsis is proffered. We also read an account of this problem with responses and meta-responses. I think the use of meta-responses was very clever and likely to be true. I am merely contending that catharsis and masochism fit into that paradigm. Masochism is the practice of deriving pleasure from pain, in its most basic form. If the response is painful and sad, and then the meta-response, because the bad emotions were just catharticly removed, is positive, there is an accounting which synthesizes masochism, catharsis, and the meta-response.
This question is typically posed while denying that many people are inherently masochistic and as often as that is denied the affirmative solution of catharsis is proffered. We also read an account of this problem with responses and meta-responses. I think the use of meta-responses was very clever and likely to be true. I am merely contending that catharsis and masochism fit into that paradigm. Masochism is the practice of deriving pleasure from pain, in its most basic form. If the response is painful and sad, and then the meta-response, because the bad emotions were just catharticly removed, is positive, there is an accounting which synthesizes masochism, catharsis, and the meta-response.
Q&A Question 2: Characters
How important to our emotional reactions to fiction are the specifics of the characters?
This question affords me to opportunity to explicate my proffered solution to the paradox of fiction that I attempted, poorly, to articulate on Wednesday. As my question suggests, I think we are too focused on the characters of a story. Mistake me not, the characters are important to our emotional reaction, but what is irrelevant is the fact that they do not exist.
If the leg of a real sea captain, a captain whom we know, is removed by a large white whale, we would react with a certain emotion. This event has a certain form to it: Person (P)who we care about (PC)is harmed (H) in a particular way. (I understand this is a drastic oversimplification but it shall suffice for our purposes.) It is this concept that we are reacting to; (PC) is (H) and to this there is a corresponding emotional reaction. Nota Bene: if it was not someone we cared about, but rather merely (P) is (H) then the reaction, and the concept, would be different.
When we read Moby Dick, we encounter Ahab (P) and because Melville writes it so, we begin to care about him (PC) and then he is harmed in a particular way (H) and so the form is the same: (PC) is (H). We react to the form of the concept, not to the reality of the characters.
This question affords me to opportunity to explicate my proffered solution to the paradox of fiction that I attempted, poorly, to articulate on Wednesday. As my question suggests, I think we are too focused on the characters of a story. Mistake me not, the characters are important to our emotional reaction, but what is irrelevant is the fact that they do not exist.
If the leg of a real sea captain, a captain whom we know, is removed by a large white whale, we would react with a certain emotion. This event has a certain form to it: Person (P)who we care about (PC)is harmed (H) in a particular way. (I understand this is a drastic oversimplification but it shall suffice for our purposes.) It is this concept that we are reacting to; (PC) is (H) and to this there is a corresponding emotional reaction. Nota Bene: if it was not someone we cared about, but rather merely (P) is (H) then the reaction, and the concept, would be different.
When we read Moby Dick, we encounter Ahab (P) and because Melville writes it so, we begin to care about him (PC) and then he is harmed in a particular way (H) and so the form is the same: (PC) is (H). We react to the form of the concept, not to the reality of the characters.
Q&A Question 1: The Rationality of Emotions
To what extent can emotional reactions, responses that are largely non-cognitive, be rational or irrational?
This question is obviously begotten by Radford's acceptance of the fiction paradox thus rendering our emotional reactions to fiction irrational. I take as axiomatic that emotional reactions generally, but especially in response to fiction, are not actions of volition. If this is true, then the lack of will involved would seem to indicate that emotional processes are, at least partially, non-cognitive. For something to be irrational, or for that matter rational, it must be the product, or potentially the product, of reason and thought. If emotions are not processes of volition, then they are not the potential product of reason and thought and therefore cannot be irrational.
Are my premises true? Are emotional processes largely non-cognitive? Does it follow from this that they cannot be irrational?
This question is obviously begotten by Radford's acceptance of the fiction paradox thus rendering our emotional reactions to fiction irrational. I take as axiomatic that emotional reactions generally, but especially in response to fiction, are not actions of volition. If this is true, then the lack of will involved would seem to indicate that emotional processes are, at least partially, non-cognitive. For something to be irrational, or for that matter rational, it must be the product, or potentially the product, of reason and thought. If emotions are not processes of volition, then they are not the potential product of reason and thought and therefore cannot be irrational.
Are my premises true? Are emotional processes largely non-cognitive? Does it follow from this that they cannot be irrational?
Sunday, February 12, 2012
Games of Fiction
Brett asked on Friday, in reference to Walton, whether, according to him, fiction was the game played or the product of playing the game. I wanted to offer my opinion on this interesting question. However, as a preface, I would like to assert the obscurity of Walton's prose as the genesis of any and all confusion herein.
The game itself, whether or not the game is actually fiction, occurs when someone engages with a prop. Walton is atypically explicit in that the prop is not the work of fiction. I am tempted to claim that fiction is an entity which is the product of engaging with a prop that incites the imagination. Again, this is not my definition of fiction; I think that Walton, and the others, over complicate the issue. Within the confines of Walton's theory it seems more likely that fiction is the product and not the game.
Question: Is there a significant, in any way, metaphysical difference between ghe two aforementioned options?
The game itself, whether or not the game is actually fiction, occurs when someone engages with a prop. Walton is atypically explicit in that the prop is not the work of fiction. I am tempted to claim that fiction is an entity which is the product of engaging with a prop that incites the imagination. Again, this is not my definition of fiction; I think that Walton, and the others, over complicate the issue. Within the confines of Walton's theory it seems more likely that fiction is the product and not the game.
Question: Is there a significant, in any way, metaphysical difference between ghe two aforementioned options?
Friday, February 10, 2012
Fiction Q&A Question 2
Question 2: Is a stylistically altered account of a real event fictional?
From all the conceptualizations of fiction that I have read and encountered include some form of falsity. The events of the narrative must be, to at least some degree representational of things that did not happen. My question is at what degree of separation from reality is an account said to be fictional? I would be tempted to claim that even the slightest alteration would render it false and therefore fictional. However, just stylistic renderings, poetic language and advanced diction, do not render such things fictional, although I admit it may be difficult to effectively use such language and remain completely true to the facts.
From all the conceptualizations of fiction that I have read and encountered include some form of falsity. The events of the narrative must be, to at least some degree representational of things that did not happen. My question is at what degree of separation from reality is an account said to be fictional? I would be tempted to claim that even the slightest alteration would render it false and therefore fictional. However, just stylistic renderings, poetic language and advanced diction, do not render such things fictional, although I admit it may be difficult to effectively use such language and remain completely true to the facts.
Fiction Q&A Question 1
Q&A Question One: Why cannot an assertion, a la Searle, be a lie?
Searle enumerated many necessary conditions for an illocutionary act to be an assertion, and amongst them he placed the condition that the utterer of the act must believe the truthfulness of the claim. I would be more than ready to accept this as a stipulation if but we were given an adequate claim, but with my admittedly insufficient reading, encountered no such defense.
It seems to me that there is a sensible manner in which we can talk about not only a false assertion but an assertion that is a lie. In the face of the paucity of reason to not consider this plausible I must assume it is.
Question: Is there a reason to think, other than the completion of his pet theory, that we should forgo the thought of a statement that is both an assertion and a lie.
Searle enumerated many necessary conditions for an illocutionary act to be an assertion, and amongst them he placed the condition that the utterer of the act must believe the truthfulness of the claim. I would be more than ready to accept this as a stipulation if but we were given an adequate claim, but with my admittedly insufficient reading, encountered no such defense.
It seems to me that there is a sensible manner in which we can talk about not only a false assertion but an assertion that is a lie. In the face of the paucity of reason to not consider this plausible I must assume it is.
Question: Is there a reason to think, other than the completion of his pet theory, that we should forgo the thought of a statement that is both an assertion and a lie.
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