I found while rereading Moby Dick this last time, a new fascination with Chapter Nine: The Sermon. I wonder what role the preacher and, more importantly, the sermon plays in the narrative. Two lines in particular stuck out to me.
The first was the last lesson the sermon was supposed to teach: "To preach the truth to the face of Falsehood." This echos somewhat one of the things Melville bemoaned in a letter to Hawthorne: that writers cannot tell the truth to their readers and expect success. One possibility was that this was Melville injecting some of his preference into the story through this sermon.
The second was the idea that Jonah thought his punishment just and was grateful for it. The idea of being grateful for punishment is rather alien, but on further reflection, punishment, when effectively employed can serve as an educational tool. The punishee may not be grateful at the time but they may be in the future. Jonah understood his actions were wrong and thus the punishment did not anger him. It is a lesson we all could learn and be better for.
I'm interested; what role do you think the sermon played in the narrative?
Friday, March 9, 2012
Ishmael as Reformed
Sarah Ott describes Ishmael as a conservative puritan. While Ishmael does identify himself as a puritan, I think there are numerous textual references that stand as significant evidence against his conservatism.
Ismael once prays, with Queequeg, to an Idol. This is a charitable interpretation of the bible, not a hallmark of a conservative christian.
In reference to Queequeg, Ishmael, on page 57 says: "I'll try a pagan friend, thought I, since Christian kindness has proved but hollow courtesy." Not only does he willingly befriend a pagan, but the self critical view of Christianity is almost exclusively not a quality found in a conservative.
Again, near the beginning of chapter seventeen, Ismael decides not to interrupt Queequeg's Ramadan because Christians ought not disturb anyone's manner of worship and that Christians ought not feel religiously superior to any others. Such religious superiority is certainly often the viewpoint of conservative Christians.
Ismael once prays, with Queequeg, to an Idol. This is a charitable interpretation of the bible, not a hallmark of a conservative christian.
In reference to Queequeg, Ishmael, on page 57 says: "I'll try a pagan friend, thought I, since Christian kindness has proved but hollow courtesy." Not only does he willingly befriend a pagan, but the self critical view of Christianity is almost exclusively not a quality found in a conservative.
Again, near the beginning of chapter seventeen, Ismael decides not to interrupt Queequeg's Ramadan because Christians ought not disturb anyone's manner of worship and that Christians ought not feel religiously superior to any others. Such religious superiority is certainly often the viewpoint of conservative Christians.
Wednesday, March 7, 2012
Of Ott Paradoxes
I voiced in class on monday the idea that Ott was speaking, at most, of mere contradictions and, at least, unimportant tensions. As such, I was contending that the use of the term 'paradox' was incorrect. We settled the issue by claiming that ascribing contradictory discriptors to a single entity would constitute a paradox. What we missed was a line on page 28, a line that should have been articulated on page 1: "Melville's important contribution to both the novel's theme and structure is this counterbalancing of opposing tensions - what I have called paradoxes" (28). So a paradox, stipulated by Ott is merely an opposing tension. This is an understanding of this essay and of Melville that is more satisfactory to me. Properly, again, she ought to have mentioned this from the start and not more than half way through her paper, but it is revealing nonetheless.
Wednesday, February 22, 2012
The Pursuit of Literature
I voiced, today, the possibility, indeed proffered the hypothesis, that writers of literature and writers of philisophical discourse have distinct ends. The philosopher aims at truth while the novelist aims at the aesthetic. I used the term 'entertaining' today and I wish to recant that; it was an incorrect term. The novelist may be trying to convey an important concept, he might be trying even to get at the truth, but once she has chosen the form of literature as his medium, she commits himself to producing a work that is aesthetically pleasing. The aesthetic pleasure is an essential goal of the form.
Therefore, the use of metaphor and the laudability thereof is also distinct. It is my contention that the metaphor adds no meaning and is mostly an aestheticconsideration. Now, aesthetic considerations are extremely important but much more important for the novelist than the philosopher. I actually think that philosophers should pay some more attention to the aesthetic but not at the price of obscurity.
Therefore, the use of metaphor and the laudability thereof is also distinct. It is my contention that the metaphor adds no meaning and is mostly an aestheticconsideration. Now, aesthetic considerations are extremely important but much more important for the novelist than the philosopher. I actually think that philosophers should pay some more attention to the aesthetic but not at the price of obscurity.
Q&A Question 2: Do Metaphors Exist?
If a metaphor meant merely what the literal words meant, then would metaphors exist?
This question attempts to take seriously the thesis of Davidson's paper. "This paper is concerned with what metaphors mean, and its thesis is that metaphors mean what the words, in their most literal interpretation, mean, and nothing more."
Davidsom acknowledges that this is controversial and is contrary to much, if not all, of previous opinion on the matter. As long as Davidson accepts that a phrase such as "Richard is a lion" is actually a metaphor, it is difficult to understand how he defends his position. All people who utter metaphors are merely mistaken? Metaphors become mere falsehoods. Literal prose and metaphors become one and the same; metaphors, as distinct linguistic entities cease to be.
This question attempts to take seriously the thesis of Davidson's paper. "This paper is concerned with what metaphors mean, and its thesis is that metaphors mean what the words, in their most literal interpretation, mean, and nothing more."
Davidsom acknowledges that this is controversial and is contrary to much, if not all, of previous opinion on the matter. As long as Davidson accepts that a phrase such as "Richard is a lion" is actually a metaphor, it is difficult to understand how he defends his position. All people who utter metaphors are merely mistaken? Metaphors become mere falsehoods. Literal prose and metaphors become one and the same; metaphors, as distinct linguistic entities cease to be.
Q&A Question 1: Metaphors in Philosophy
If metaphors are not only ornamental but can augment the impact of meaning, thought not semantically, would it then be acceptable to use metaphors in philosophical discourse?
My question from the q&a depends on my argument that while metaphors can be translated to purely literal language, that is that they do not introduce any unique semantic meaning, they still possess an twofold import that literal language lacks. The second half of the import is increased potency; metaphors, as with most indirect communication, has the potential to render the meaning of the metaphor more potent and longer lasting. A smartly crafted metaphor will have more impact.
Now, if this is true, which I do think so, there may be some venerable reasons to employ metaphors in philosophical discourse. I chose philosophical discourse as it is my discipline and the discipline of this seminar, but it may hold true for other academic writing as well.
So the question is: does the increased impact provide a benefit enough to override the inherent imprecision of a metaphor?
My question from the q&a depends on my argument that while metaphors can be translated to purely literal language, that is that they do not introduce any unique semantic meaning, they still possess an twofold import that literal language lacks. The second half of the import is increased potency; metaphors, as with most indirect communication, has the potential to render the meaning of the metaphor more potent and longer lasting. A smartly crafted metaphor will have more impact.
Now, if this is true, which I do think so, there may be some venerable reasons to employ metaphors in philosophical discourse. I chose philosophical discourse as it is my discipline and the discipline of this seminar, but it may hold true for other academic writing as well.
So the question is: does the increased impact provide a benefit enough to override the inherent imprecision of a metaphor?
The Pursuit of Ethics
Brett asked about the role of emotion in the philosophical pursuit of ethics. It is a fascinating question and one I wish to address.
Philosophy is often errantly conceived of as reason to the extent of existing as a wholly non-emotional discipline. This is, strictly, incorrect. Emotions are ever present and it would be foolish to deny it; the question then becomes an issue of how best to deal with the emotions. The problem, if it needs stating, is that emotions are, to some degree (less than is often thought), non-cognitive, or not regulated by reason. Therefore, in any attempt to arrive at the truth, non-reasonable entities are seen as a liability.
I want to distinguish between writing or thinking emotionally and writing or thinking about emotion. Philosophers would be neglegent to neglect the role emotions do play in making ethical decisions. As such emotions must be the subject of much philosophical discourse. On the other hand, emotions probably ought not be used in the formulation of ethical theory.
That having been said, I am not of the opinion that philosophical discourse must be dry, direct...etc... Emotional discourse can be included without too much trouble I think but only as augmentation, in addition to the reason, never in lieu thereof.
Philosophy is often errantly conceived of as reason to the extent of existing as a wholly non-emotional discipline. This is, strictly, incorrect. Emotions are ever present and it would be foolish to deny it; the question then becomes an issue of how best to deal with the emotions. The problem, if it needs stating, is that emotions are, to some degree (less than is often thought), non-cognitive, or not regulated by reason. Therefore, in any attempt to arrive at the truth, non-reasonable entities are seen as a liability.
I want to distinguish between writing or thinking emotionally and writing or thinking about emotion. Philosophers would be neglegent to neglect the role emotions do play in making ethical decisions. As such emotions must be the subject of much philosophical discourse. On the other hand, emotions probably ought not be used in the formulation of ethical theory.
That having been said, I am not of the opinion that philosophical discourse must be dry, direct...etc... Emotional discourse can be included without too much trouble I think but only as augmentation, in addition to the reason, never in lieu thereof.
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